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  A social network of stock trading is defined for the notorious South Sea 
Bubble of 1720. It is a flow network defined in terms of pass-through and core 
pass-through, which have convenient properties with respect to inventories. 
These  are  all  useful  concepts  when  examining  a  liquidity  crisis,  financial 
intermediation and the changing social structure of trade. We find that there 
may  have  been  a  liquidity  crisis  suffered  by  goldsmith  bankers  before  the 
Bubble,  a  gradual  path  towards  dis-intermediation  after  the  Bubble  and  a 
switch  from  intermediation  based  upon  brokerage  to  intermediation  based 
upon dealership.  
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 1. Introduction 
If an investor today wished to buy a share in a prominently traded stock of a public 
joint-stock corporation, how likely is it that he or she would know, or even have to 
know, who was the previous owner of the share? The answer is that in the impersonal 
and highly intermediated financial markets of today there is almost no likelihood that 
buyers would have or require such knowledge. Yet in early 18
th century Britain trade 
in shares of even the most important public firms could easily be carried out face-to-
face between buyer and seller. Historians have described how Britain developed 
secondary trade in the markets for shares in which investors interacted directly with 
financial intermediaries and other investors, largely in the City of London, and were 
much more likely than today to personally know each other and to deal directly with 
each other (Dickson, 1967; Neal, 1990; Carlos and Neal, 2006, 2008; Carruthers, 
1994; Murphy, 2009; Neal and Quinn, 2001). London had even started to differentiate 
itself from the financial systems of the Low Countries in such ways that it was 
attracting overseas investors who could also personally interact with British investors 
and intermediaries in the City (Carlos and Neal, 2011). Face-to-face stock market 
trading was feasible throughout the 18
th Century and indeed one of the best-selling 
financial how-to books of the century (Mortimer, 1761) was published in more than a 
dozen editions and gave detailed instructions to investors about how to avoid 
middlemen and thus reduce their personal costs of transactions by seeking out buyers 
and sellers directly. 
As different as early stock markets of Britain were from modern stock markets, 
they still managed to produce financial crises that resonate today. The South Sea 
Bubble remains today unarguably the most notorious of the historical financial bubble 
episodes (Garber, 2000). The Bubble refers to the events in the year 1720 associated   2 
with a scheme to convert much of the British national debt into equity shares of the 
South Sea Company  (Scott, 1910; Dickson, 1967; Carswell, 1993; Neal, 1990). There 
was an attendant stock market boom and crash that took place in a very short time - in 
about the six months between April and October 1720. The stock market events that 
affected South Sea share values affected the value of a wide range of stocks, Bank of 
England and East India Company shares included (Fig. 1).  But the South Sea Bubble 
is very remote in time and there is very little in the way of data that are of a good 
standard so as to be useful to a financial economist who wishes to study the Bubble. 
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that a description of a time-series of social 
networks of stock trading during the South Sea Bubble produces important clues as to 













































































Fig. 1. End-of-month share values for Bank of England (BoE) and East India 
Company (EIC) stocks (Freke, 1719-21).   3 
Network theory can help explain asset bubbles in several ways. The 
connections between financial models of information cascades and networks are the 
operable links that make the study of networks potentially fruitful. Some asset pricing 
models that naturally generate frenzies and crashes have been based upon auction 
theory. The essence of an auction is that it is a market in which buyers and sellers 
choose when to participate. Persons‟ decisions to arrive at a market and to depart from 
a market can be modelled as a purely random process (Bulow and Klemperer, 1994), 
but can also be influenced by information, such as in financial “herding” models 
(Welch, 1992), which describe the coalescence of persons‟ opinions towards a 
common valuation of a good. Such herding can be modelled on a network (Golub and 
Jackson, 2010) in which convergence to beliefs is determined by the influence (trust) 
wielded by individuals, such as financial intermediaries.  Networks also provide a 
framework for the discovery and understanding of the intermediation that such 
persons perform. For a homogenous good, such as a corporate share, there is no need 
for intermediaries to certify the quality of the goods bought and sold, yet 
intermediaries may stand ready to provide liquidity services in trade and they may 
also otherwise offer the lowest cost mechanisms for bringing buyers and sellers 
together. The role of intermediates‟ inventories has been of interest in recent studies 
of liquidity and financial crises (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Comerton-Forde, 
Hendershott et. al., 2010). Repeated transactions through intermediaries may also 
create trust that builds bridges to other networks that are not directly observable, such 
as networks for trade in foreign exchange, physical goods and payments clearances 
(Rauch, 2001). 
The plan of this paper is first to define a flow network for stock trading in 
which the importance of trading nodes is related to frequency of trade, size of trades   4 
and accumulated stock inventories (Section 3). The paper depends upon some results 
from a parallel paper that has a different expositional emphasis (Mays and Shea, 
2011). In that paper is a much more detailed discussion than is contained in Section 2 
that follows here about the data sources and descriptive statistics of stock trading 
during the South Sea Bubble. The emphasis in this paper will be to describe the global 
characteristics of the trading networks and then to relate them to social affiliations. In 
our other paper more attention is devoted to analysing the social affiliations that are 
most useful in defining network partitions. In both papers we document a number of 
changes in the global and local nature of trading networks that coincide with major 
events of the Bubble. Although we cannot yet definitively link these changes to the 
kinds of information cascades of interest to financial economists, some of them do 
bear a resemblance to phenomena we would expect to see in a liquidity crisis. 
 
2. Data 
Our data consist of all trade in shares for the East India Company and the Bank of 
England in the years 1719-21. What we shall call the South Sea Bubble period is the 
six months from the end of April to the end of October 1720. This effectively 
encompasses the stock market boom and collapse (Fig. 1). Unfortunately the data do 
not record stock trade in actual value terms, but they only record the number of shares 
passing between stock account owners. Although the data can show volumes of trade 
passing through a network, they cannot show how shareholder returns were 
distributed on those same networks. A minority of the records will also include some 
trade between family members and between business partners that we cannot consider 
to be purely market transactions. Additionally the trade data in stocks does not show 
the extent to which stocks were frequently used as security in other financial contracts,   5 
such as forward loan or forward foreign exchange agreements (Neal and Quinn, 2001). 
There was probably an unobservable network of indirect ownership and trade in 
shares that is only imperfectly reflected in our data and some of the ownership that 
appears in the company ledgers that we use may actually represent ownership in trust 
for other persons. But for the most part the trade recorded in our sources would have 
reflected the interest in trade in society as that interest ebbed and waned through the 
Bubble period. 
At any time in the years 1719-21 there were about 1800 persons or institutions 
who held stock in the East India Company (hereafter, the EIC) and for the entire 
period there were more than 3600 such stock accounts to be found in the EIC records 
(India Office Records L/A/G/14/5/4, 1719-23). Records covering the years 1720-25 
contain the ownership and trade for nearly 8000 stock account holders for the Bank of 
England (Carlos and Neal, 2006). We have melded the EIC data with the Carlos and 
Neal Bank of England (hereafter, the BoE) data and restructured all data into a 
multidigraph. Directed edges represent sales of stocks from one account holder to 
another and the edge weights correspond to the nominal size of the sale. Edges in the 
graphs have other attributes, which are changeable through time. Each edge, of course, 
has a date that corresponds to date of sale. The type of stock (EIC or BoE) transacted 
is also an edge-attribute. We have also been able to calculate the size of stock 
inventories held by each buyer and seller. Socio-economic characteristics of stock 
account holders are coded as [0-1]-binary data, which are treated as node attributes. 
They include gender, professional class, social class, political class, residence, and 
nationality. 
A device we use throughout this paper is the time-series analysis of subgraphs 
defined by edge-dates that span a 3-month range. A monthly series of such graphs and   6 
their characteristics are used to create what amounts to moving-average trends in 
network characteristics. The entire dataset contains more than 20,000 trades (edges) 
and more than 10,000 nodes. From this graph we create our monthly quarterly 
subgraphs which contain from 2500 to 3000 BoE nodes and about 1500 to 2000 EIC 
nodes in each quarter. The largest connected components in these subgraphs are a few 
hundred nodes for each company‟s stock trade in the years 1719 and 1721 and up to 
1000 BoE nodes and 800 EIC nodes during the Bubble episode of 1720. 
 
3. A flow network with pass-through, core pass-through and 
inventories 
We define an enclosed flow network for stocks. It has neither an exterior source of 
flows nor has it an exterior sink to receive flows, yet every node can be a stopping 
place for flows. The accumulated flows at any node (inventories) can reside at the 
node indefinitely and are limited in size only by the total amount of stock contained 
within the network. Consider a multidigraph defined on a set of nodes {V}. Stock 
sales and purchases are the flows that pass between persons whom we represent as 
nodes. The i-th instance of a flow between two nodes {u,w} is denoted fi(u,w), with 
fi(u,w) ≥ 0,  . V w , u   Over a period of time there might be a number of such flows, 




 . For the same period we 
define net flows from u to w to be F(u,w) = f(u,w) – f(w,u). It follows naturally that 
F(u,w) = -F(w,u). The sum of all net flows towards node w is the change in w‟s stock 




  . For networks, such as ours, in which the sum of all 
inventories is fixed, 0 w
V w
 
  .   7 
Closely related to inventory changes is the concept of pass-through. Pass-
through measures the extent to which a node facilitates flows through a network. 
Pass-through will be proportional to the number of flows (degree) and the sizes (edge 
weights) of individual flows that pass through a node. Whether a node is important or 
not, in either a sociological or economic sense, will most certainly be determined by 
pass-through and inventories together. The resulting measures of node importance 
will be related to, but distinct from other measures of centrality in a weighted network 
that have been discussed previously (Opsahla,  Agneessensb and Skvoretzc, 2010). 
Formally we define pass-through (PT) to be the portion of flows into a node 
that does not positively contribute to the node‟s inventories: 
 
] , 0 min[ ) u , w ( f ) w , u ( f , ) u , w ( f min PT w










    .  (1)
   
Unlike in a pneumatic flow network, whose network edges will generally have 
capacity constraints upon them, there is no intrinsic limit to PT through any node or in 
the network as a whole, except that total PT cannot exceed total flows or, in other 
words, total sales. This we can readily confirm from (1) by summing over all nodes‟ 
pass-through: 
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Total Sales will thus be the natural choice as a normalisation factor for pass-through.   8 
Similar to the World Wide Web, we would expect that our network would 
have a central densely-connected component and other less-densely connected 
components (Broder, A., Kumar, R., et. al., 2000). At any time there were many nodes, 
including some with very large inventories of stock, who did not trade, but when 
people did happen to trade, they did so largely within a densely connected giant 
component. The reasons why this was so are connected to the activities of 
professional financial dealers and brokers in these markets. We emphasize that this is 
an unremarkable statement only when writing in terms of modern stock markets, but 
in the early 18
th Century the development of modern stock market structures, 
dominated by professional financial intermediaries, was just in its infancy. The stock 
markets of 1720 possessed every potential of being purely face-to-face markets, 
markets in which every buyer and seller could actively seek out counterparties 
directly within networks of social affiliations as readily as counterparties could be 
brought together by professional intermediaries. 
Isolated nodes experience no pass-through, of course, but even very small 
trading components might contain some pass-through. A node that facilitates pass-
through is hardly likely, however, to represent a specialist financial intermediary 
unless it is connected to other similar nodes that facilitate pass-through. Thus we 
come to a notion of what we term core pass-through (CPT). A node facilitates CPT if 
it has pass-through and it is connected (via pass-through) with other nodes that also 
facilitate pass-through. Formally the set of nodes that reside in this core is defined 
} 0 PT . t . s V u , 0 ) u , w ( F , 0 PT : V w { u w      . It is within this core that we expect 
to find the nodes that are most closely associated with financial intermediaries of 
interest to us. The size of this core relative to the other trading components in our 
network indicates the importance of specialist intermediaries during the South Sea   9 
Bubble. In Fig. 2 is illustrated the substantive differences between the networks for 
BoE and EIC stock trade in terms of PT and CPT. The giant connected components 
for BoE and EIC are respectively quite different, EIC PT being a larger percentage of 
trade and taking place within a much more densely connected core network than is the 
case for BoE PT. Over time, as well, there occurred a change in these large-scale 
properties of our networks. After 1720, pass-through declines as a percentage of total 
sales and core pass-through declines as a percentage of pass-through. 
Distributions of PT also exhibit considerable skewness. At any time a very 
small number of nodes command very large percentages of PT and CPT and, by 
extension, large percentages of total sales. We have to look in the highest ½ of the 
first percentile of such distributions to see interesting differences in the respective EIC 
and BoE CPT. Outside of the top first percentile there were no traders whose CPT 
would amount to any more than the tiniest fraction of a percent of total sales. Within 
the top ½ of the first percentile, however, we can discover some traders whose CPT 
could account for substantial portions of total sales. In Fig. 3 it is clear that the heyday 
of the top CPT-trader occurred before the South Sea Bubble. These top traders were 
generally members of a professional financier class, the goldsmith bankers along with 
a smaller number of professional brokers. We have applied the label GSBs to such 
people and in our data they number in all about 240 individuals, acting singly or in 
partnerships. In EIC trade in particular the heyday of the top CPT trader, the trader 
who could be a core intermediary of at least 10 percent of a total sales over a quarter, 
occurred prior to the South Sea Bubble. In the case of BoE trade such    10 
Fig. 2. Pass through and core pass through for Bank of England (BoE) and East India 
Company (EIC) stock trade. 







































































































































BoE  11 
Fig.3. The range in terms of percents of total sales of the top one-half of the first 
percentile of Bank of England (BoE) and East India Company (EIC) core pass-through 
(CPT). 




















































































































































































s  12 
intermediaries existed only briefly in the first quarter of 1720. Once the Bubble period 
commenced, this type of intermediary simply disappeared, largely due to the demise 
of the GSBs (Section 6, Mays and Shea, 2011). 
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 together present evidence that the stock markets to some 
extent experienced disintermediation during and after 1720. Fig. 3 shows that the very 
largest of the most highly connected intermediaries had their heyday before the stock 
market boom of 1720 began, while Fig. 2 shows that the prominence of PT in total 
sales and the prominence of CPT within PT both declined after 1720. 
To what extent can the features of Fig. 2 be related to the more fundamental 
characteristics of the networks? To answer this we have undertaken the simulation of 
some random networks. PT and CPT are obviously positive functions of trade 
frequency. The frequency with which persons trade is expressed as the number of 
flows that enter and leave a node. A node‟s joint in-degree and out-degree is defined 



















wu u N N DS . The set of all nodes with a stated maximum (MAX) of 
degree sums is  } MAX DS : V u { u   and from the simple cardinality (#) of this set 
relative to the cardinality of V itself we can build a cumulative distribution of degree 
sums over any range of MAX of interest to us.  In Fig. 4 we plot for the two stocks 



















The trade in EIC shares was more frequent than trade in BoE shares and trade 
in both companies‟ shares was more intense in 1720 than it was in the years 
surrounding 1720. EIC stock trade was not only more frequent, but also it tended to 
be larger on a per-trade basis than was BoE stock trade.
2 But the extent to which 
frequency of trade and size of trades can jointly explain some of the features of Fig. 2 
are not apparent. We attempt to explore this issue in simulation of random networks. 
We start by building two-dimensional empirical histograms of in- and out-degrees and 
randomly re-sample (100 times) from these histograms to create in-degree and out-
                                                 
2 Both facts that are established also by direct enumeration of 
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Fig. 4. Cumulative distribution of node degree sums for networks of  Bank of England (BoE) and East India 
Company (EIC) stock trades in the periods 1719-21 and 1720, separately.  14 
degree tuples. From these we generate randomly configured directed multigraphs.
3 
The graphs‟ edge weights are independently and uniformly distributed randomly 
generated numbers on the [0,1]-line. The averages of each of the 100 monthly 
simulations are pictured in Fig. 5. 
It is clear that the higher frequencies of trade for EIC stocks can account only 
for some of the features of Fig. 2. Pass-through as a percentage of sales is accounted 
for in terms of order of magnitude; these are simulated to be between 60 percent and 
40 percent for both EIC and BoE trade before 1721, which roughly corresponds to 
what we see in Fig. 2, but the clear separation between these percents for EIC and 
BoE trade that we see in Fig. 2 is not clearly mimicked in Fig. 5. The comparison of 
simulated CPT as a percentage of PT is less satisfactory. That percentage is greater 
for the EIC data than it is for the BoE data, but the size of EIC CPT relative to BoE 
CPT is clearly not nearly as great as it is in Fig. 2. The inter-period variability of BoE 
CPT is also not well captured in Fig. 5. 
We extend our simulation analysis by trying to capture the effects of edge 
weights. We now construct 4-dimensional histograms of nodes‟ in- and out-degrees, 
joint with in-edge weights and out-edge weights. Again we randomly sample from 
these histograms (100 times) per quarter. Joint distributions of edge weights with 
node degrees clearly play a role in the relative extent to which CPT is a percentage of 
PT. The lower panel of Fig. 6 shows a clear separation between EIC and BoE CPT 
very similar to that displayed in Fig. 2. This verisimilitude however comes at some 
cost in the upper panel of Fig 6. In that panel both EIC and BoE PT are reduced as a 
percentage of Total Sales relative to what appears in the upper panel of Fig. 2. 
                                                 
3 This is performed by the Python 2.6 program embodied in Networkx 
1.3, networkx.generators.degree_seq.directed_configuration_model, 
following an algorithm laid down by Newman, Strogatz and Watts (2001). 
The empirical histograms are based upon the same monthly subgraphs 
whose features are pictured in Figs. 2 and 3.   15 
Fig. 5. Simulated pass-through and core pass-through for Bank of England (BoE) and 
East India Company (EIC) stock trade on random graphs conditional upon empirical 
degree distributions and independent uniformly-distributed [0,1] random edge 
weights. 







































































































































BoE  16 
 
Fig. 6. Simulated pass-through and core pass-through for Bank of England (BoE) and 
East India Company (EIC) stock trade on random graphs conditional upon empirical 
joint node-degree and edge-weight distributions. 







































































































































BoE  17 
There is no surprise that some of the features of Fig. 2 can be mimicked by 
simulations on random graphs based upon empirical frequency-of-trade and size-of-
trade distributions. But it is clear too that there is more information in our networks 
that need to be exploited to more fully explain the features of Figs. 2 and 3. What 
have clearly been left out are the social character of traders and the dynamics of 
inventories that they handle. 
 
4. The dynamic behaviour of inventories and intermediation 
Inventories must figure in the importance of a node in our networks, but we would 
need a model of the joint determination of inventories with edge weight (trade) flows 
before we can proceed further with simulation exercises such as those presented in the 
previous section. An economic model in which financial intermediaries optimize 
some function of trade flows and inventories will dictate the shape of their joint 
distribution. But what kind of inventory behaviour would such a model have to 
explain? To search for an answer to this, we proceed on two fronts in an: i)  by 
describing the interesting global behaviours with respect to inventories in our 
networks and ii) by describing the extent to which network nodes can be assigned to 
social and professional classes that relate to inventory and PT-flow behaviours. In the 
process, it is discovered that two different styles of financial intermediation naturally 
emerge in our networks – brokerage and dealership. 
At any time large numbers of people did not trade, even during the height of 
the Bubble, so we cannot expect that shifts in inventory distributions would be very 
great, except over long periods. Amongst active traders, however, inventories did shift 
significantly and there were trends in that regard both with respect to the social 
attributes of inventory owners and how buyers and sellers networked with each other.   18 
Corporate shares can be expected to earn positive returns and are like capital goods in 
that respect. Decisions to acquire and to dispose of such goods can be optimally 
managed to respond to expectations in returns for such goods. The more an individual 
earns from financial intermediation, however, the more inventories will figure in his 
cost of doing business. We cannot argue that the physical carrying costs of stock 
inventories would be as large as they would be for inventories of physical 
commodities, but we can argue that the costs of controlling risks associated with such 
carriage could be significant. Intermediaries might be acting like speculators and will 
need personal capital or will have to borrow in order to fund their investments. 
Inventories of stock can act as collateral for borrowing, but the lower their quality as 
collateral, the larger inventories will have to become to serve as collateral for a given 
amount of borrowing. Larger inventories may be a response to speculative losses 
(losses to personal capital) and/or a lowering in the quality of inventories because 
they have lost some of their liquidity (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Comerton-
Forde, Hendershott et. al., 2010). On the other hand, before the appearance of the 
specialist market-maker of today, the possession of inventories might also have been a 
way of signalling to the markets that a speculator stood ready to buy and sell and have 
been a factor in reducing his search costs for customers. In equilibrium, strong 
financing for speculators, high-quality inventories that can act as collateral and low 
customer-search costs will tend to produce intermediaries that can operate with small 
inventories relative to the flows they service. Otherwise with weak financing for 
speculators, low-quality inventories and high customer-search costs, we will expect to 
find that intermediaries will have to have high inventories relative to the flows they 
service.   19 
In our networks total inventories of stocks are fixed and therefore all changes in 
inventories must sum to zero. We would nevertheless expect that the distributions of 
inventories, especially amongst speculators, would change as the Bubble crisis 
unfolded. Speculators would experience gains and losses, which affects their personal 
capital. They would then have to adjust their inventories of stock by size and quality 
as collateral in their efforts to manage liquidity risk. It behooves us therefore to 
examine the inventory history of buyers and sellers of shares. Instead of defining an 
edge weight between buyer and seller in terms of trade flows, suppose that we 
redefine edge weights in terms of the relative size of buyers‟ and sellers‟ inventories. 
Imagine two persons who are counterparties in a transfer of shares. A logarithm of the 
relative inventories of the two would be approximately zero as long as the two 
inventories were not too different in size. Taking into account that a buyer‟s inventory 
of stock can be zero at time of purchase, consider the properties of the following 
function (RINVuw) of the relative inventories of a buyer (w) and a seller (u): 
 
    u w 10 uw Inv / Inv 1 log RINV                 (3) 
 
where  w Inv  stands for the stock inventory of node w. 
When buyers‟ and sellers‟ inventories are independently and homogenously 
distributed, RINVuw will be expected to be log10(2) = 0.3 between all nodes. We could 
further imagine that the distributions of inventories could depart from homogeneity 
over time, but not be able to do so indefinitely. For example, buyers‟ inventories 
could not indefinitely be twice the size of sellers‟ inventories (RINVuw= 0.5); 
eventually buyers‟ inventories would have to start to decline relative to sellers‟ 
inventories. Thus 0.3 has to be an attractor for RINVuw, although we cannot yet be   20 
specific as to its strength as an attractor. In Fig. 7 is illustrated a 90-day moving 
average trend for RINVuw for both BoE and EIC stocks. In the figure is also illustrated 
the 6-month period (end April to end October, 1720) that encompasses the market 
boom and crash in share prices. Clearly the South Sea Bubble divides our data into 
two distinct periods in terms of inventory behaviours. Although there clearly appears 
to be trend at all times, average RINVuw  stays much closer to 0.3 after September 
1720 than it does in the period before. In the earlier period the deviation from 0.3 is 
marked and the strength of 0.3 as an attractor is most evident. What is most striking, 
however, is that before the Bubble the trends for BoE and EIC appear to follow a 
mutual countercycle, whereas after the Bubble the trends co-move with each other. 
Coincidence in this regard is excluded. We can explain the pre-Bubble trends in terms 
of the behaviour of the only group of individuals that can we associate with 












Fig. 7. Log-relative buyers‟ and sellers‟ inventories for Bank of England (BoE) 
































































































SS Bubble  21 
Prior to the market collapse in September 1720, purchases of EIC stock, as 
opposed to purchases of BoE stock, were dominated by relatively large buyers. As far 
as EIC stocks are concerned, Fig. 7 is consistent with the usual history of the South 
Sea Bubble that states that 1720 was a year in which specially inexperienced investors 
were drawn towards the stock markets. After short and intense inventory 
accumulations in late summer 1719 and in early 1720, the Bubble period was largely 
marked by a steady downward trend in the size of buyers‟ inventories relative to those 
of sellers. Inexperienced investors would have to buy, by necessity, from people who 
possessed much larger inventories of stock. Another line of reasoning, however, is 
possible. What contemporaries and historians have characterised as a rise to 
prominence of inexperienced investors might have been confused with the rise to 
prominence of new classes of stock traders who were perhaps displacing formerly 
prominent traders in stock. All classes of traders may have already been present in the 
market as investors, but some classes were previously active in trade and others were 
relatively dormant in trade before and after the South Sea Bubble. If the trading roles 
of such classes were interchanged, we might very well see the inventory dynamics 
that we have found so far. What may have appeared to contemporaries as a new type 
of stock market participant may well have been a person who was an experienced 
investor, and who may well have had even large inventories of stock, but who was 
newly attracted to active trading in 1720. 
If there was one class of stock owner/trader which famously underwent great 
changes during the South Sea Bubble, it was surely the previously discussed GSBs. 
Large numbers of them allegedly went to the wall as trade credit began to shrink in 
the summer of 1720. As prominent members of the financial community at the time, 
they held large amounts of stock, but as their financial difficulties grew, their   22 
prominence in trade suffered a drastic change. With our data we can define, for the 
first time, the extent of this class‟s involvement in stock ownership and trade 
throughout the Bubble year and can present strong evidence that the inventory trends 
in Fig. 7 have much to do with the inventory behaviour of goldsmith bankers and 
brokers. In Fig. 8 is illustrated the trends in RINVuw for GSB traders as buyers and 
sellers separately. The figure clearly shows that in the years 1719-21 GSBs sold stock 
to other individuals (inclusive of other GSBs) who had inventories generally no larger 
nor smaller than their own inventories. As buyers of stock quite prior to the Bubble, 
however, GSBs behaved quite differently. Their inventories were much larger (up to 7 
times larger) than the inventories possessed by persons from whom they purchased 
stock. The decline in the relative size of their inventories was rapid at the 
commencement of the Bubble and the decline did not stop until the Bubble itself 
collapsed. We know that the trends in Fig. 8 are driving the overall EIC inventory 
trends in Fig. 7 because GSB trade in this period was such a large percentage of trade. 
We know too that GSB inventory adjustments in this period were largely a movement 
away from inventories in EIC stock into inventories of relatively low-risk BoE stock – 
precisely what appears to be the „flight-to-quality‟ phenomenon often noted as the 








                                                 
4 See also discussion with regard to Figs. 9 and 10 in Mays and Shea 












Flight to quality may have saved some GSBs from destruction, but we know that 
overall it did not. By the end of 1720 GSBs were no longer the dominant traders or 
inventory holders of either BoE or EIC stock. Their departure from the markets was 
associated with a change in the structure of intermediation as well. The economic 
distinction between brokerage and dealership is made naturally in our network setup. 
We define brokerage to be the facilitation of pass-through with the aid of little or no 
inventories. Opposite to brokerage is dealership, in which inventories are relatively 







Fig. 8. Log-relative buyers‟ and sellers‟ inventories for EIC stocks, GSBs as 















































































































GSBs were largely brokers; they did indeed command very large inventories, 
but not so large relative to the amounts of PT they facilitated. With the demise of the 
GSBs intermediation did not end, but was placed on a different footing – one that 
depended upon dealership more than it did on brokerage. Persons, largely of the 
merchant class, who were already substantial investors took over from GSBs in the 
facilitation of PT and CPT. During the Bubble itself such facilitators also included 
company directors themselves, but for the most part they were foreign merchants or 
were British-domiciled Jews, also largely of the merchant class. This is clearest in the 
case of EIC stock (Fig. 10). In BoE trade dealership also displaced brokerage in 
intermediation, although it is more difficult to see trends in this regard by social 
affiliations (Fig. 11) because BoE CPT itself became quite small and more volatile as 







Fig. 9. Financial intermediation naturally divided into a) brokerage and 
b) dealership in terms of inventories (INV) and pass-through (PT).   25 
thus marked by highly volatile inventory behaviour by the formerly dominant 
intermediaries - GSBs. And with their decline and demise as intermediaries, the form 











































































































































Fig. 10. Brokerage, dealership and CPT in EIC stock by social affiliation, 1719-21.   26 






































































































































Fig. 11. Brokerage, dealership and CPT in BoE stock by social affiliation, 1719-21.   27 
5. Conclusions and directions for further research 
Historians have long known that social and professional affiliations in the stock 
markets of the early 18
th Century were important. Our understanding, however, of the 
effects of affiliation on trade, intermediation and ownership has been incomplete. 
When what trading data we have is organised into a stock-flow network, significant 
evidence of much of what we suspected we would find and a good number of 
surprises, as well, emerge. We have defined networks of trade in terms of weighted 
multidigraphs. And we have defined the importance of nodes (stock owners) in terms 
of their importance in trade. Frequency of trade (node degree) and size of trade figure 
in determining a node‟s importance through our measures of pass through (PT) and 
core pass through (CPT). PT and CPT are not just flows – they are flows that are most 
closely associated with financial intermediation. Therefore, when we look at node 
importance in terms of PT relative to total sales or in terms of CPT relative to PT, the 
most important nodes are most likely also to be the most important financial 
intermediaries. Not surprisingly, the goldsmith bankers and brokers (the GSBs), as a 
social/professional group, dominated intermediation in the markets prior to the 
Bubble. More surprising, however, is that their importance began to rapidly decline 
even before the stock market boom of 1720 commenced. Equally surprising is that 
intermediation was not immediately harmed by the withdrawal of GSBs from the 
markets. To a large extent a merchant class, much of it Jewish and much of it foreign, 
stepped in and maintained previous levels of intermediation to at least the end of 1720. 
Aided a little by company directors too, merchant classes operated with higher 
inventories than did the GSBs. Intermediation in the stock markets thus started to 
move from brokerage towards dealership.   28 
With regard to the South Sea Bubble itself, have we found any information 
that can further our understanding of it? The demise of the GSBs has every 
appearance of a cascade in our network data and it apparently pre-dates the stock 
market boom itself (Figs. 7, 8, 10 and 11; Figs. 9 and 10, Mays and Shea, 2011). We 
can speculate that it was the removal of GSB influence that may have enabled the 
stock markets to move to a newly inflated valuation of equity values. This would a 
possibility in a social learning model, such as that presented by Golub and Jackson 
(2010). Further research, however, is needed to affirm what happened to the GSBs – 
whether their ownership and intermediation in stocks truly declined or were simply 
moved into other markets, such as other companies‟ share markets. The higher risk 
share markets, such as those for the Royal African Company‟s shares, offer some 
further scope for study along these lines. 
Clearly too an effort is now required in developing behavioural models of 
financial intermediation  (with inventories) on a network. Why social and professional 
affiliations would appear to be correlated with the scale of intermediation (PT), the 
density of intermediation (CPT) and the style of intermediation (brokerage vs. 
dealership) remains unclear. It may have been the case, for example, that the demise 
of the GSBs made room for a new social class of financial intermediaries who were 
simply inexperienced in brokerage and who would in time master it. Or perhaps the 
credit conditions that allowed brokerage to dominate in intermediation disappeared in 
1720 and dealer intermediates were able to competitively displace the GSBs because 
they had better social connections. It will take some further research before we can 
isolate such social network effects from the economic explanations of what happened 
to intermediation in the course of the South Sea Bubble.   29 
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